



# Adapting Militaries to Peacekeeping and Policing Roles: The Effects of Peacekeeping on Militaries and the Stresses and Strains of Operations

*Garren Mulloy<sup>1</sup>*

## **I. Introduction**

While peacekeeping is a familiar concept, with attendant problems of use of force, civil cooperation, and political interface, there is less clear understanding of the problems faced by militaries in adapting themselves to peacekeeping and policing roles. Most studies of militaries and peacekeeping have focused upon mission effectiveness: a vital concern but which takes no account of the stresses on militaries of peacekeeping and policing roles, while maintaining forces at peak war-fighting standards. Intra-military, inter-military, and inter-agency stress points need to be examined, while addressing psychological stresses on individual peacekeepers. Peacekeeping operations place particular forms of strain on the personnel and institutions conducting them. Apart from the obvious matters of physical discomfort and danger, there are stresses associated with multi-national, multi-agency cooperative work, operating in areas with poor infrastructure, in unfamiliar languages, and, a point too often over-looked, in roles for which institutions and personnel may be quite unfamiliar. There is an old saying that peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it. What is clear from this study is that soldiers cannot do it alone. The military-peacekeeping spectrum is exceptionally broad, and there are very few militaries able to cover its demanding range. Trying to use military forces as all-purpose 'fire-fighters' whenever a local conflict threatens to burn out of control has the potential for extremely serious damage to the military personnel and institutions, and consequently also carries significant risk of mission failure.

This paper will examine the nature of peacekeeping and other forms of peace operations (section II), the contradictory demands placed upon military forces of participating in them (III), the dilemmas posed by the requirements for security (IV), and the stresses created within operations by differing practices and standards between countries and institutions, including military and civilian bodies (V). The institutional and personal interface stress points shall be

---

<sup>1</sup> Garren Mulloy is lecturer in the Faculty of International Relations of Daito Bunka University (Japan). This paper was presented at the *Second Annual Conference on Human Security, Terrorism and Organized Crime in the Western Balkan Region*, organized by the HUMSEC project in Sarajevo, 4-6 October 2007.

examined (VI), together with the lack of training provided for many of the key tasks of peacekeeping (VII), culminating in a review of 'best practice' in peace operations (VIII).

In a speech in Tokyo in 2001, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata stated that she considered the military to be essential for humanitarian operations in many parts of the world. Her reasoning was that only the military could dispatch resources globally, with large amounts of engineering equipment and logistics support, able to operate in the harshest natural and security climates, for the improvement of human security. When questioned if this did not constitute the 'militarization of aid', she responded that it merely constituted the best way, in the short term, to ensure human security.<sup>2</sup> Following her lead, the aim of this paper is not to propose a single national, institutional or theoretical model, let alone to 'militarize human security', but rather to attempt to identify how global peacekeeping 'best practice' and inter-agency cooperation can be ensured for the most effective peacekeeping effort possible with the minimum of adverse effects for the peacekeepers. A situation far worse than an overly militaristic approach to human security would be for militaries to turn their backs on human security for the fear of damaging themselves in the process. In the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, that would appear to be unlikely.

## II. What is Peacekeeping?

Although 'peacekeeping' is a common reference to the operations conducted by United Nations 'Blue Helmets', it is also a common term used for a range of operations conducted by the UN and a number of other international bodies. In this paper, general peacekeeping operations ('broad PKO', referred to as PKO) shall be used as a common reference to the range of peace operations, which most commonly encompass peacekeeping ('narrow PKO': providing ambient security and observers for monitoring of a peace agreement or ceasefire), peace support (PSO: support services to a 'narrow PKO', such as logistics, aid to the civil power, and infrastructure renewal), and peace enforcement (PEO: pro-active operations designed to force compliance with a peace agreement, including the considerable use of force) operations (hereafter considered together as 'PKO' unless there is specific reference to the 3 mission variants within 'broad PKO'). This is in accord with the *Brahimi Report* of 2000, which attempted to reduce the division between the three types of armed peace operations listed, partly as an attempt to make PKO more palatable to participants, partly out of practical recognition that local situations are fluid and require fluid responses (the 'mandate creep' so criticised in the 1990s), and partly as certain countries, such as Japan, are unable to perform many elements of PKO by legal or constitutional constraints, to their, and the UN's, discomfort.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, PKO fits into the peace operations spectrum between the Peace Making Operation (PMO) phase of negotiation, and the post-conflict or post-negotiation phase of Peace Building Operations (PBO).

---

<sup>2</sup> Ogata, Sadako, Speech at the United Nations University, Tokyo, 12 December 2001. Available online at: <http://www.unu.edu/hq/public-lectures/ogata.pdf> (All websites listed as references were checked as accessible on 28 August 2007, except for those only available to subscribers, in which case retrieval dates are provided).

<sup>3</sup> Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305 and S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. Available online at: [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/docs/a\\_55\\_305.pdf](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/a_55_305.pdf).



UN PKO have become a standard by which all others are measured, but there is a huge variety of missions and institutions involved. The activities ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan would be characterized as some form of peace operation, yet at times varying between PMO, PBO, and between the three PKO, PSO, and PEO variants within the broad *Brahimi* PKO definition, and could additionally be labelled as anti-terrorist operations, or expeditionary warfare, beyond the scope of this study. The European Union (EU), African Union (AU), and other multinational bodies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have overseen PKO, as have certain countries as leaders of ‘coalitions of the willing’, such as Australia in East Timor. These non-UN missions may well still retain a distinctive UN-flavour by adhering to UN PKO norms, and through agencies such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Practically every post-Cold War PKO has been of the ‘complex mission’ type, with extensive civilian support and development functions known as ‘nation building’, which naturally attracts a large number of international and domestic Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO). The pattern was established by the UN Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) from 1989, through the missions in Cambodia, and Bosnia, to the present missions in Sierra Leone and Congo. The notion that a PKO resembles the rigid, simple, hierarchical pyramid of an army is as outdated as the notion that armies exist only to fight wars.

### **III. The Contradictory Demands of Maintaining Standards and Operational Deployments**

There is an inherent contradiction in the utilization of military force. While operational experience generally enhances the skills base of the force, deployment depletes capability. The metaphor of the samurai sword is pertinent, that it is most effective when its presence is noted by potential adversaries, rather than when unsheathed. Each time the sword is used, its blade is dulled and its user tires, even though the user learns from each encounter. Professional soldiers fear the over-utilization of their military forces as much as any peace campaigner. In particular, soldiers fear the dissipation of professional capabilities and force potential by the use of troops in ‘irregular’ operations, for which they are rarely well equipped or trained. The deepening of the contradictory conundrum for soldiers (and sailors, and airmen) in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is that such ‘irregular’ operations have become the regular fair of armed forces, while ‘regular’ operations, conventional war fighting, have become rare, if not yet, sadly, extinct. PKO stretch the abilities of militaries by the breadth of the military-peacekeeping spectrum, in both tasks and intensity.

#### **A Experience as Vital Asset**

Armed forces have responded in widely different ways to such challenges. The British Army is generally viewed as one of the most effective in such ‘irregular’ Operations Other Than War (OOTW), and to a large degree this is due to not only the (distant) experiences of empire but also the presence of troops in Northern Ireland for policing and anti-terrorist duties. An officer of the UK Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre described this as “*the key point*” in

understanding the British approach to OOTW.<sup>4</sup> Northern Ireland became such a vital part of Army duties that investments were made in training and equipment, and the bread and butter low-intensity, high-concentration modes of operations were perfected and integrated into all training down to the lowest levels, becoming near instinctive.<sup>5</sup> While the Army's Northern Ireland deployment ended in 2007, the tough years of the 1970s and 1980s, with NATO-area Cold War defence establishments, allowed the British Army to rest, re-configure, re-train, and rotate units between Northern Ireland, the UK, Germany, and overseas territories, even though more than 20% of infantry personnel were serving there. Even the Falklands War saw no major disruption to this cycle. In this sense, such 'OOTW' and expeditionary operations were complimentary to 'conventional' Army training, even regarded as highly useful for keeping a 'fine edge' on units' readiness.

It is important to add that the British public have generally been highly supportive of their armed forces, and all British governments since the 1960s have viewed military prowess as a way of maintaining British prestige and influence long after withdrawal from Empire had reduced the UK to 'middle power' status. The ability of the military to be able to cover an incredibly wide spectrum is a political imperative. It allows the UK government to 'punch above its weight' on the world stage, and also allows for savings in public finance. While the latter point may seem rather odd, given Britain has usually been in the top five of military spending nations, the UK armed forces cover a range of duties which in other countries are usually covered by civil defence, police, coastguard and other civilian agencies, such as air-sea and mountain rescue, fisheries and natural resource protection, anti-terrorism special forces, and a whole host of civil contingency duties.

The challenge of militaries today is for the maintenance of an ever widening skills base, with ever more rapid mission deployment rotations, and deepening intensity levels. The countries worst affected are, naturally, the US, UK, Australia, and Canada. The first three are deeply committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, while Canada is engaged in intensive Afghan operations, and all are engaged elsewhere in a range of peacekeeping and other missions. Robert Wisner has identified how US Army units' military skills deteriorated during the course of PKO missions, and also how that deterioration was expressed in the frustration of contingent members, particularly when drawn from a 'teeth' arm (such as an airborne infantry battalion).<sup>6</sup>

### ***B Investments in People and Materiel: Civil and Military***

The demands of such levels of rotation have led to the increasing use of reservists by certain countries, including in PKO. Britain has used reservists, both volunteer reserves and those ex-regular troops recalled to the colours, in increasing numbers since the Gulf War of 1991, and they were present in the Balkans in the 1990s, in African operations, and in both Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years. Significant numbers of reserve troops from Australia and New Zea-

---

<sup>4</sup> Interview, Spence, Commander Nick, JDCC, September 2000, JDCC now known as the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).

<sup>5</sup> The phrase "*Low Intensity Operations*" was devised by Frank Kitson as the title of the book he wrote while commanding an infantry brigade in Northern Ireland; Kitson, Frank, *Low Intensity Operations*, Faber, London, 1971.

<sup>6</sup> Wisner, RA, *Task Identification and Skill Deterioration in Peacekeeping Operations*, pp.91-109, in Britt, Thomas W. and Amy B. Adler (eds), *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper*, Praeger, Westport, 2003.



land have served in East Timor, practically all of the US Army Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) units deployed to rebuild Kosovo in 1999 were reservist-manned, and since 9/11 the US has deployed Army Reserve and National Guard troops in their largest numbers since World War II. The use of reservists has many problems associated, such as time taken to deploy, legal restrictions on their use, and the psychological and economic effects of lengthy service, but for militaries attempting to maintain war-fighting potential, they are a cheap way to maintain a broad base of capabilities within tight budgets.

Another human resources management device as well as skill-multiplier for PKO has been the large scale use of paramilitary forces. While the description of 'paramilitary' may be inappropriate, the equivalents of military police, gendarmerie and carabinieri may also not help to understand their role in their own nations, let alone as part of PKO in host nations. These forces, such as the Italian Carabinieri, are self-standing armed forces within national militaries, and thus can be differentiated from military police forces found *within* most militaries. Indeed, the Italian force has suffered the greatest single operational casualty toll of the Italian military since 1945, with 17 Carabinieri personnel killed in an Iraq bombing incident in 2003. The Italian force has also established The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (Co-ESPU) and is deeply engaged in allied efforts to promote police training skills in the military-peacekeeping context.<sup>7</sup> However, the 2004 "*G8 Action Plan: Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations*", which laid down the basis for the expansion of such forces, envisaged roles in crowd control, firearms training, and human rights law, fields in which many militaries have also proven able practitioners.<sup>8</sup> While they have greater specialization, and have contributed most effectively to PKO, they do not usually have unique skills unavailable to 'broad spectrum' militaries. Where they can contribute more effectively is when certain militaries have skills gaps, constitutional limitations upon operations affecting civilians, or when military forces simply have little civilian cooperation experience. Some European Union Police Mission (EUPM) staff have commented that some gendarmerie personnel lack the civilian police skills of forensic examination and investigation, particularly in case building, thus hampering military efforts in policing.<sup>9</sup> In this sense, the military may require units with skills they do not possess at all, rather than paramilitary forces with similar skills. Furthermore, de-militarization of the common social arena is usually one aim of a PKO, with an EUPM official going further, declaring that his mission goal in Bosnia is to assist the development of local police capabilities, to rapidly make himself, the EUPM, and the military component, EUFOR, unemployed, but beginning with EUFOR.<sup>10</sup>

A further complication is legal status. Carabinieri/gendarmerie forces have been utilized both within the military elements of PKO and as parts of the CIVPOL police missions. These provide very different roles, and demand very different skills of the same personnel. There is equivalent confusion in the nature of forces allocated to PKO. US National Guard units are, in peacetime, state (non-federal) forces, and thus civilian in nature. When embodied by presidential order they become designated as military forces and are utilized as such in operations. Gendarmerie may be designated as either military or civilian, depending on each coun-

---

<sup>7</sup> Bohn, Lt. Col. Don, *Formed Police Units Workshop and Seminar*, Issue Paper No. 2006-04, US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, January 2007. Available online at: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/pksoi/Docs/policeunits.pdf>.

<sup>8</sup> *G8 Action Plan: Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations*, Sea Island Summit, 10 June 2004. Available online at: <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2004seaisland/peace.html>.

<sup>9</sup> Interview/conversations with EUPM personnel, Sarajevo, 3 October 2007.

<sup>10</sup> Interview, Sarajevo, 3 October 2007.

try, and may additionally be designated as civilian or military within PKO regardless of their domestic status. The French Gendarmerie Nationale is a military force, yet administered in peacetime under the Ministry of the Interior, with investigations subjugated to investigating magistrates' supervision. The Dutch Royal Marechaussee (Royal Military Constabulary) similarly operates as an armed force for roles often designated by the Ministry of Justice, but provides more of a border guard force than French or Italian equivalents, including international organized crime responsibility.<sup>11</sup> The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) provide very similar functions to the previously listed forces, and have performed alongside gendarmerie units in PKO, and yet remains a completely civilian force, despite having significant border guard and counter-terrorism functions. What is true of such land based paramilitary forces is also true of their maritime colleagues. Japan has a purely civilian coastguard, as do Singapore and Canada, while the US Coastguard is a hybrid, akin to Gendarmerie. Britain relies upon its regular military services to perform both land and maritime paramilitary functions, with the Royal Navy performing the fisheries, natural resource, and sea lane functions of coastguard forces, in the same 'broad spectrum' pattern as the Army.

The most significant difference between these military and police forces is perhaps the difference of the chain of command, with the military force commander often having direct access to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), and, at times, even functioning as the Assistant or Acting SRSG. CIVPOL officers have often voiced their concerns that they lack sufficient influence on PKO missions when compared to their military colleagues.

The main budget priorities of practically all militaries remain at the hi-tech, intense war-fighting end of the scale, not with PKO-related matters. Japan is desperate to buy *F-22* fighters from the US, but for 15 years has had vastly inadequate airlift for even its very limited PKO commitments. Britain is funding a new class of large aircraft carriers, the *Eurofighter Typhoon*, and was the first overseas investor in the US *Joint Strike Fighter*, yet its troops have had to make do with poor communications and useless identification equipment, so that in operations troops often rely on their personal mobile phones and many troops have been killed by 'blue on blue' 'friendly fire' incidents.<sup>12</sup> Thus, most militaries and governments prioritize equipment for war, but activity for peace. Peacekeeping brings national and international recognition, but corresponds with relatively little investment in the most high profile of operations.

Even when investments have been made, their value has often been rapidly reduced. Equipment is currently being consumed by the intensity of operational deployments at an unforeseen rate, with the US Army reportedly suffering from 40%, or \$ 212 billion of equipment being effectively worn out.<sup>13</sup> New Zealand was typical of many smaller militaries when it participated in the East Timor missions, for its range of air lift options was too limited, the numbers of aircraft too few, and the toll of operations upon types so great that there was serious consideration of mission withdrawal, only averted by allied contributions and the change

---

<sup>11</sup> Blok, Chan, *Policing in the Netherlands*, Police Department of the Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, January 2004. Available online at: [http://www.politie.nl/Overige/Images/33\\_85725.pdf](http://www.politie.nl/Overige/Images/33_85725.pdf) .

<sup>12</sup> Townsend, Mark, *Why won't the US tell us how Matty died?*, in: The Observer, 4 February 2007. Available online at: [http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk\\_news/story/0,,2005595,00.html](http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,2005595,00.html) .

<sup>13</sup> Beaumont, Peter, *Fatigue cripples US army in Iraq*, in: The Observer, 12 August 2007. Available online at: <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,2147052,00.html> .

in pattern of operations.<sup>14</sup> There are also diverse demands upon equipment, and for specialized investment. Armoured vehicles are one such case, being considered essential for PKO, and in the 1990s most Western governments developed light, air-portable armoured personnel carriers (APC), ideal for the rapid reaction PKO forces being configured. The Iraq War demonstrated a latent need for heavily armoured forces, to be succeeded by the lighter, PKO-style contingents, but as the security situation deteriorated, so a new breed of vehicles was required, with very high levels of armour protection, good visibility, and V-shaped hulls to deflect explosive devices. These new vehicles were urgently needed, in large numbers, but are beyond the limits of most countries air-lift capabilities. With each change in operational requirements, the militaries concerned have to re-evaluate, test, purchase, train personnel, equip logistic support, and then deploy. This process has exhausted both staff and budgets.

### ***C What is the Military There For?***

Rupert Smith explains that since 1945, through to today, the role of the ‘industrial army’, as most armies have appeared in the modern era, has been to achieve tactical success within a pattern of strategic success, and yet, only the Falklands Conflict of 1982 allowed military forces to unite these two points. The Falkland Islands were retaken following an illegal invasion and occupation, by Britain’s ‘industrial military’, and the strategic *status quo* restored. Every other major conflict has been a source of confusion and frustration for professional soldiers trained for such ‘clean’ results, with the Gulf War conclusion leading to sanctions, and air campaign, and, finally, the Iraq War and present bloody occupation, and most peace missions concluding with either an equivocal or at least less than perfect result.<sup>15</sup> This suggests that the public and military understanding of military roles is somehow faulty. It is the ‘post-industrial’ or ‘post-modern’ military forces that must take the strain in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and be equipped and trained to cover a massive spectrum of tasks, and expect neither a clean and simple outcome, nor a necessarily popular outcome. Equipping and training forces for such operations is extremely difficult, for, to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, troops are being asked to prepare for ‘known unknowns’. One of the hardest tasks facing the proponents of collective security is to persuade governments, militaries, soldiers, and their national communities that the sacrifices are worthy of the results. When narrow issues of ‘national security’ seem to be so little affected, it is little wonder that operations by the leading developed-world countries have been concentrated closer to home or to narrowly defined strategic interests, with a subsequently semi-detached view of events in the parts of Asia and Africa with the poorest economic and human security environments.

---

<sup>14</sup> Interviews: Downes, Cathy, New Zealand Ministry of Defence, February 2002; Dickens, David, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand, February 2002. New Zealand had a very small force of UH-1 helicopters, unable to operate in ‘hot and high’ conditions, and C-130 transport aircraft, stretched by operational and maintenance demands, and by age.

<sup>15</sup> Smith, Rupert, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, Penguin, London, 2006, pp. 267-278.

#### IV. Unit Security and Community-Human Security

At the United Nations Organization's 60th Anniversary Summit, the Responsibility to Protect was firmly endorsed. The basis of this Responsibility was expounded as:

*"The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapter VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."*<sup>16</sup>

This entails that all organs of the international community are duty bound to preserve life from threats no matter what. While the Responsibility was not confined to PKO, and was intended to reinforce the development and climate action aims of the *High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change*, the most visible and obvious agents of nation states that comprise this supposed international community, are the uniformed participants in peacekeeping operations and other deployments.<sup>17</sup> One of the great dilemmas facing such a national contingent commander is to what degree he (for almost all commanders have thus far been men) is willing to risk the lives of his personnel for the protection of others?<sup>18</sup>

##### A Force Security as Priority

Examining operations where security has been poorest the answers to the 'how much risk' question are extremely varied. In Somalia, there were many cases of UN troops putting themselves in harms way in order to protect government and judicial officers, NGO staff, and fellow UN contingents, with the efforts of Malaysian and Pakistani forces being most notable.<sup>19</sup> Somalia, unfortunately, is perhaps more famous for its association with *Blackhawk Down*, the enthralling book (later dramatised for cinema) on US forces' misadventures in the country

<sup>16</sup> UN General Assembly, *UN Summit Outcome Document*, A/Res/60/1, 24 October 2005. Available online at: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement> .

<sup>17</sup> Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, A/59/565, United Nations Publications, 2 December 2004. Available online at: <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf> .

<sup>18</sup> The first all female PKO unit was deployed to Liberia in January 2007, a para-military police unit from India: Ross, Will, *Liberia gets all-female peacekeeping force*, in: BBC News, 31 January 2007. Available online at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6316387.stm>

<sup>19</sup> See, Howe, Jonathan T, *Somalia: Frustration in a Failed Nation*, in: Benton, B (ed), *Soldiers for Peace: Fifty Years of United Nations Peacekeeping*, Facts on File, New York, 1996, pp.158-185; Cain, Kenneth, Heidi Pos-tlewait and Andrew Thomson, *Emergency Sex and Other Desperate Measures: a True Story from Hell on Earth*, Ebury Press, London, 2005.

while reconfiguring a famine relief and security mission into an anti-terrorist, nation building mission.<sup>20</sup> In Iraq, US forces have shown a somewhat surprising, if perhaps unconscious, determination to continue on from Somalia, Fallujah being only one of many examples where US forces have conducted large-scale, high-intensity, urban military operations, with significant US casualties in pursuit of an anti-terrorist, nation building agenda. The problem inherent in this is the difficulty in balancing such efforts with the responsibility to protect the civil population. US forces entering Fallujah contradicted their own doctrine in leafletting their offensive plans to the local populace. The loss of surprise was expected, however, to be balanced out by the moral confidence that the remaining population was hostile, and that this would, in effect, create the sort of 'free fire zones' established by the British in Malaya's jungles in the 1950s. Both assumptions were incorrect, and it seems difficult even now to assess what affect the operations had on security in Iraq, while the human casualties are also almost impossible to assess, such is the level of destruction and the degree of insecurity remaining in the area.

In Iraq, the contrast of such high intensity operations with low-level intensity operations conducted by other US forces has been stark. There has been a significant, and increasing, risk-averse approach to unit security, with foot patrols being almost abandoned, and vehicle patrols characterised by extreme use of firepower to apparent or possible threats. The number of cases of US troops using machine gun fire to 'keep heads down' as they speed through urban areas, or civilian drivers targeted who strayed within 150meters of US convoys on busy urban roads are legend in Iraq. Troops themselves have spoken and 'blogged' of such incidents, and with deployments extended to 15 months, and many troops on their third rotation in Iraq, the desire to stay alive seems to have taken a far grater priority than not only protecting the local populace, but also than even taking care not to incidentally kill the local populace. Human security has become regarded as a zero-sum affair.

### ***B Force Security Restrained***

In Southern Iraq, the British, Polish, and Australian forces have adopted somewhat different methods. They were initially rather more successful, but in late 2006 and throughout 2007 the security situation in the south has deteriorated significantly. Whether this is due to the somewhat more circumspect approaches of the troops is unclear. Certain American commentators have made such assertions, but it has also been contended that the south has simply begun to catch up to the centre of Iraq, and with so many smuggling opportunities around sea and land trade routes, and the ease of weapon purchase, this condition was inevitable.<sup>21</sup> What is clear is that there has been far stricter control of firepower. Air strikes have been extremely rare since the invasion, artillery is rarely used, and when firepower is applied the Rules of Engagement (ROE) have been far stricter than in US sectors. British ROE have long been highly restrictive, with only single, aimed shots at identified targets, after the issuing of a warning being permitted, as laid out in the *Yellow Card* carried by all troops.<sup>22</sup> Even during intense fighting in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, British infantry were unable to shoot gunmen who ambushed them

---

<sup>20</sup> Bowden, Mark, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War*, in: Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 1999.

<sup>21</sup> For critics of the British approach, see, Devenny, Patrick and McLean, Robert, *The Battle for Basra*, in: The American Spectator, 11 January 2005. Available online at: [http://www.spectator.org/dsp\\_article.asp?art\\_id=8953](http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=8953)

<sup>22</sup> *Bloody Sunday, 1972: Lord Widgery's Report of Events in Londonderry, Northern Ireland, on 30<sup>th</sup> January 1972*, The Stationary Office, London, 2001, pp. 86-87.

if the gunmen fired off their magazine and ran away: as they no longer posed an immediate threat to life, they were not 'legitimate targets' under British ROE.

The changing of such ROE is one way in which the Iraq conflict has altered the British approach to operations in complex and hostile areas. The constant frustration never quite boiled over in the same way that it did in Northern Ireland, but that danger exists in every military exposed to such legal and instinctive contrary stresses.<sup>23</sup>

### **C Force Security as Insecurity**

Rupert Smith acknowledges the desire of the soldier to overpower opponents, to win, and to demonstrate superior ability and power, but that we should, "...always remember Foucault's dictum: power is not a possession but a relationship."<sup>24</sup> The desire to protect one's own troops is sometimes a very powerful factor in isolating troops from the local populace. This, inevitably, affects the ability of those troops to conduct peacekeeping, including being able to protect themselves. Nathaniel Fick has argued most persuasively that such tactical security advantages have serious strategic security disadvantages:

*"When we retreat behind body armor and concrete barriers, it becomes impossible to understand the society we claim to defend. If we emphasize "force protection" above all else, we will never develop the cultural understanding, relationships and intelligence we need to win. Accepting the greater tactical risk of reaching out to Afghans reduces the strategic risk that the Taliban will return to power."*<sup>25</sup>

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the budgets for reconstruction have been skewed towards funding immediate, tactical protection, sometimes with up to 80% for 'security', the effect of which is to starve development projects of funds.<sup>26</sup> However, as even a security hawk such as Robert McNamara understood in 1968, "*security is development, and without development there can be no security.*"<sup>27</sup>

### **V. National, Multi-National and Institutional Diversity of Standards**

Standards naturally differ between institutions, and more so when national divides are crossed. These are due to differences in experience and perceptions of needs, differences of economic development and cultural standards and requirements, as well as political and social

---

<sup>23</sup> Specific ROE offences include the 'Bloody Sunday' shootings and road checkpoint incidents. See, *Bloody Sunday, 1972: Lord Widgery's Report of Events in Londonderry, Northern Ireland, on 30<sup>th</sup> January 1972*, The Stationary Office, London, 2001; also, BBC, *Clegg had 'no excuse' for shooting*, in: BBC, 9<sup>th</sup> November 1998. Available online at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/210512.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/210512.stm) .

<sup>24</sup> Smith, Rupert, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, p. 242.

<sup>25</sup> Fick, Nathaniel, *Fight Less, Win More*, in: The Washington Post, 12<sup>th</sup> August 2007. Available online at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/09/AR2007080900667.html> .

<sup>26</sup> Fick, Nathaniel, *Fight Less, Win More*.

<sup>27</sup> McNamara, Robert S, *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office*, quoted in Clutterbuck, RL, *Fingers in the Mangle: British Military Commitments in the Third World*, in: Brassey's Annual, 1972, pp. 10-22, p. 19.

pressures. In PKO, the diversity that can be such a tremendous blessing to an organization, providing a broad skills base and multi-aspect analytical capabilities, has often been seen as a liability, not only to good peacekeeping, but also to the use of PKO as a ‘force improvement’ opportunity. An even further separation of standards is usually seen in the interface between civilian and military components of the entire PKO mission, and between components within the mission and those beyond. The most diverse points on the spectrum can be characterized as between the ‘conventional’ military minds, and the ‘alternative’ non-profit and charity sector minds, but this fails to accommodate the nuances of an uneven and broad field.

### **A. *Incompetence and Inability***

The head of Civilian Police (CIVPOL) units in Cambodia expressed his astonishment that many of the CIVPOL officers assigned to the UN Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC) had no pre-deployment training, no local or mission language skills, no driving skills (despite specific requests), and, most shockingly, only a passing familiarity with basic police procedures and moral standing that may be termed as a ‘global standard. The Singaporean CIVPOL commander in Sihanoukville had a hard time getting his multi-national force of officers to patrol after dark.’<sup>28</sup> UNTAC commanders were also aware that the local Cambodia police were, “*quite helpless and unprofessional*”, a situation not conducive to high morale among PKO CIVPOL.<sup>29</sup>

UNTAC was blighted in other ways, for the Political Commissioner was forced to repatriate 40 staff on disciplinary grounds, while the force commander, Lt-General Sanderson, had to deal with the mass of problems associated with badly equipped, poorly led, and terribly behaved troops, which resulted in the repatriation of certain Bulgarian and Uruguayan units for disciplinary offences, mainly towards the local population they were allegedly protecting.<sup>30</sup>

### **B. *Infrastructure and Legality***

One of the difficulties facing troops and police engaged in peacekeeping is the very real possibility that there simply is no standard form of legal infrastructure by which to process those accused of crimes. This means that UN staff may feel unable to deal with the demands placed upon them by the local populace and possibly the UN structure itself. In Cambodia, this led to the unprecedented system whereby the UN created its own legal infrastructure of law, courts, and methods of processing cases from scratch.<sup>31</sup> By contrast, in Afghanistan personnel have been forced to release people apprehended by German police and military units, even when caught in the process of carrying out attacks upon German forces. The reasons are twofold: there are no established courts and judicial institutions in the areas concerned, and German

<sup>28</sup> Chye, Oh Kar, *Civilian Police Contingent in UNTAC: Observations and Lessons Learned*, in Azimi, Nassarine (ed), *The Role and Functions of Civilian Police in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, UNITAR, Singapore, 1996.

<sup>29</sup> Chye, Oh Kar, *Civilian Police Contingent in UNTAC: Observations and Lessons Learned*, p. 139.

<sup>30</sup> Chye, Oh Kar, *Civilian Police Contingent in UNTAC: Observations and Lessons Learned*; Conversation with Lt-General Sanderson, United Nations University, Tokyo, December 1999; Heiniger, Janet E, *Peacekeeping in Transition: the United Nations in Cambodia*, 20<sup>th</sup> Century Fund Press, New York, 1994.

<sup>31</sup> Appendix C: *The UNTAC Code*, 10 September 1992. Available online at: [http://www.alrc.net/doc/mainfile.php/unar\\_cat\\_cam\\_2003/321](http://www.alrc.net/doc/mainfile.php/unar_cat_cam_2003/321) .

law dictates that prisoners cannot be released into the custody of any police forces suspected of brutality, as are the local Afghan police forces operating in the German sector.<sup>32</sup> Peacekeepers must be prepared for such eventualities and to readily understand the diversity of standards and deviations from their perceptions of ‘norms’.

### ***C Armed Civilians and Peacekeeping***

Increasingly, post-conflict development and peacekeeping work is a multi-agency affair, and many such agencies operate well outside the UN umbrella. While the issues related to working with NGO will be examined, increasingly peacekeepers have to also adjust to having ‘non-state armed forces’ in their vicinity. These may be militias, clans, dissident groups or general ‘spoilers’, those who feel they lose more than they gain from the PKO and wish to see it ended or modified. In recent years, though, peacekeepers have had to contend with large numbers of Private Military (Security) Companies (PMC or PSC). These were present at various stages of the civil wars and PKO in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo/Zaire, and represent (as a whole) the third largest military force in Iraq after US and Iraqi government forces. PMC personnel can create significant difficulties for peacekeepers, as they often have uncertain loyalties and chains of command, little regard for standard ROE or civilian law, and vague legal standing. Furthermore, in certain operations PMC may be working closely with mission members, even providing security for NGO and UN agencies, while not having to conform to codes behaviour and other limitations upon operational and personal freedom, and, importantly for peacekeepers’ morale, often being paid quite astronomical fees for their services.<sup>33</sup> In Iraq, US and British special forces veterans have been targeted for PMC recruitment, and there has been a trend of serving troops being ‘headhunted’. A former British SAS trooper explained:

*“I know of serving soldiers who are returning, signing off and then taking the opportunity to go back to Iraq to provide security services out there... If you think of what a man earns in the UK, maybe £500 a week, we're talking about £500 a day. You could pay off your mortgage if you do that for a year.”<sup>34</sup>*

Even if personnel have limited contact with PMC, there may be a natural effect upon morale.

### ***D Unarmed Civilians in Peacekeeping: Corporate Presence***

A further complication in PKO is the role of companies in non-security roles, often referred to as Military Support Companies/Firms (MSC or MSF), providing logistical support for national or multi-national operations. Brown and Root Services (BRS) provided logistical support for US forces in UN sanctioned missions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the latter con-

<sup>32</sup> Der Spiegel, “*Our Sacrifices Do Not Leave Me Cold*”, in: *Spiegel Online International*, 23 July 2007. Available online at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,496426,00.html> .

<sup>33</sup> Singer, PW, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Company*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2003.

<sup>34</sup> Robin Horsfall, quoted in: *Private contractors working in Iraq*, in: BBC World, 29 May 2007. Available online at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/6700765.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6700765.stm) .

tract increasing to over \$1billion.<sup>35</sup> While providing for niche skills perhaps not held by the military, and introducing a welcome degree of flexibility into logistics, the MSC adds further complication to an already tangled institutional architecture, and it is unclear whether the SRSG or Force Commander could call upon such resources directly. Rather all requests would be filtered through the contracting national contingent, leading to ‘internal’ negotiations between the contingent head, the local MSC representative, the MSC head office, and the national contracting agency (defence or foreign ministry). Thus, speed and flexibility would seem to be compromised.

### ***E Unarmed Civilians in Peacekeeping: Officials in the Field***

The US military has also made extensive use of directly employed civilians in operational areas, including in combat zones, with Pentagon figures indicating over 7500 have been used in operations since 9/11, with seven killed and more than a hundred injured. As Gary J. Motsek, Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Program Support stated, “*we must use government civilians ... to fill out the force or we could not do our job right now.*”<sup>36</sup> This allows for flexible and efficient use of skilled personnel, often for effective work in civilian areas, such as post-conflict reconstruction, and aid to local NGO bodies. The problem is that these civilians lack the training, equipment, and legal standing to protect themselves, or others, and therefore easily fall between the protective structures of military, UN agency, and NGO institutions.

### ***F Unarmed Civilians in Peacekeeping: The International Aid Community***

Non-peacekeeping members of PKO pose their own challenges to peacekeepers. These civilians may be UN agency staff, such as UNDP or UNHCR, or semi-integrated NGO staff. However, in practically every PKO since 1990, the mission has operated in a complex and crowded sea of NGO, with whom military personnel have often had less than perfect working relations.<sup>37</sup> General Zinni, the field commander of *Operation Provide Comfort*, aiding Kurds in Northern Iraq and Turkey in 1991, had only 6 NGO to deal with, and a simple headquarters coordinating structure. Akashi Yasushi (SRSG) and Sanderson in UNTAC had to deal with a complex headquarters, with staff of over 100 nationalities, attempting to coordinate the activities (and security) of over 100 NGO.<sup>38</sup> In Bosnia, the UNHCR mission and UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel usually cooperated well, but there was much distrust and animosity between NGO and peacekeepers, despite many individual peacekeepers becoming

<sup>35</sup> Singer, PW, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Company*, pp. 142-146.

<sup>36</sup> Scott Tyson, Anne, *Service Civilians and the Wounds of War*, in: The Washington Post, 25 July 2007. Available online at:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/24/AR2007072402459.html?hpid=topnews> .

<sup>37</sup> See, Mulloy, Garren, *Swords and Ploughshares: Military-civilian Interface in PKO*, in: Keio SFC Journal (Volume 1, Issue 1), pp. 168-193, Tokyo, 2002; and, Williams, Michael C, *Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, Adelphi Papers 321, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp. 15-78.

<sup>38</sup> Aall, Pamela, *NGOs, Conflict Management, and Peacekeeping*, in: International Peacekeeping (Volume 7, Number 1), Frank Cass, London, Spring 2000, pp. 121-141; Heineger, Janet E, *Peacekeeping in Transition: the United Nations in Cambodia*.

closely engaged with local charities and community groups.<sup>39</sup> The widespread suspicion was that NGO were often acting either in blind faith of their own security, and then demanding military assistance when that proved false, or else working as agenda advocates, actively courting security crises by entering hostile areas and then demanding UNPROFOR assistance to draw international forces into the worst areas of conflict. Both did occur, but it is also clear that the military throughout the UNPROFOR period and beyond consistently under-estimated the value of NGO in development and security, and also failed to sufficiently appreciate the role that NGO had assumed as distributor agents of Western government aid. Some of these bodies became larger than UN agencies, and in the mid-1990s it was estimated 20 US and European NGO accounted for approximately 75% of all humanitarian aid distributed.<sup>40</sup>

Military commanders have often been frustrated by the security measures taken by NGO and other civilian staff in conflict zones. This included the hiring of private security teams, which have already been mentioned as contributing to the uncertain legal and security situation in such areas. However, many NGO, with limited knowledge and budgets, hired local gunmen, often participants to the conflicts themselves, which escalated the feuds among fractious groups, and contributed to spiralling violence in countries such as Ethiopia and Somalia, thus forcing NGO to spend more on security. The nickname for the ubiquitous war-vehicle of choice in such clan conflicts is 'the technical': a pick-up truck (usually Toyota), mounting a heavy machine gun or cannon (usually Soviet), and carrying half a dozen armed men. The name came about due to the need for Western NGO to somehow place such gunmen hiring costs in their accounts, placing them under the category of 'technical expenses'. The presence of NGO-funded 'technical' passing though UN roadblocks is not one soldiers would be comfortable with, for both hard-power security and soft-power media reasons.

### **G The 'Civilianization' of Militaries?**

It was in the post-Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda period that military and NGO staff truly began to reconsider their relations. Their hierarchies may have been vastly different (layered pyramids, versus flat democracies), and in many ways their basic *raison d'être*, (establishing the norms of a status quo, as against liberation from anachronistic practices) but they began to appreciate how they could help each other, and where the niche skills of each lay. US officers would be educated in courses by the US Institute for Peace, Oxfam would visit the Ministry of Defence in London, and in Italy and Scandinavia there have been extensive training programmes integrating civilian and military personnel. What is clear is that participation in PKO has fundamentally changed many institutional and personal views of aid, development, and the role of civilians in many militaries. Some might rubbish the development as 'softening soldiers', or making militaries too 'touchy feely', but the process is essentially one that goes back to the fundamentals of COIN tactics and strategies: security cannot be created or maintained by military force alone, as it relies upon the building of political, social, and economic consen-

---

<sup>39</sup> Cook, Colonel Mark, *Promise of Hope: a Tale of Triumph Over Tragedy in War-Torn Croatia*, Penguin, London, 1995.

<sup>40</sup> Duffield, Mark, *Global Governance and the New Wars*, Zed Books, London, 2001, pp. 53-54.



sus.<sup>41</sup> The proliferation of ‘lessons learned’ institutions among militaries further emphasized this development of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).

Despite the development of more nuanced thinking in military circles, it remains the case that armed forces tend to view targets and goals in more concrete terms than many of their civilian counterparts. While UNHCR staff are tremendously concerned with tons of aid transported, numbers of people fed, housed, or repatriated, many other civilians involved in PKO are more concerned with matters less easily quantified. Development, stability, and security are notoriously difficult to quantify, and these matters are usually appreciated by military personnel, but even after two decades of complex PKO, of CIMIC, of multi-agency interface, examples such as from Afghanistan seem to re-emphasise many of the old patterns. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) established in many provinces in Afghanistan are combines of ‘best practice’ of military, UN, and NGO bodies, aiming to improve development efforts and security by a nuanced, multi-layered approach, and yet they ran into old problems of mandates and numerical targets. Many military officers saw definite mandate points as being ‘duties’ not options, while the achievement of these mandates should be measured as successful or not in terms of hard data. The main such mandate point being disarmament of ‘illegally armed groups’ (IAG), and their reintegration into mainstream society. The inherent problem of this was identifying what was an IAG, and whether local tactical and strategic development and security would be served by their disarmament. While many military officers wished to press ahead and ‘get the job done’, the diplomat in charge of political affairs was far more concerned with the development of peace processes, and making them as inclusive as possible, rather than alienating groups simply based upon weapon ownership, a common matter in that country.<sup>42</sup>

Despite this example, the PRT have provided a potential blueprint of how civilians and military forces, from differing backgrounds, with differing agendas, and facing differing institutional pressures can cooperate to good effect in peacekeeping missions. The evidence that militaries across the world are investing in such training and learning centres is one positive development. That NGO and UN agencies are increasingly aware of the diversity within militaries, that the uniforms are not uniform, and that they themselves can benefit from not only the logistic ‘muscle’ but also the experience of military personnel, can only be a positive development for human security.

## VI. Institutional and Personal Issues as Stress Factors in PKO

Each institution in PKO has its own particular agenda, as we have seen. These often create tensions within and beyond the institution, which can lead to problems for mission success. Institutional agenda and practices also create stress for the people working within and between them, and there are many instances in PKO of unnecessary stress being placed upon personnel by institutional procedures. There are also many cases whereby the innately stress-

---

<sup>41</sup> Nagl, John A, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counter-Insurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, (Second Edition) University of Chicago, 2005; Bulloch, Brigadier Gavin, *Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective*, in: *Parameters* (Volume 26, Number 2), Summer 1996, pp. 4-16. Available online at: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/96summer/bulloch.htm> .

<sup>42</sup> Piiparinen, Touko, *A Clash of Mindsets? An Insider’s Account of Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, in *International Peacekeeping* (Volume 14, Number 1), Taylor Francis, Abingdon, Oxon., February 2007, pp. 143-157.

ful roles within PKO create stress for individuals, whether due to personal living and working conditions, or by the threats to security, or the sense of difficulty in actually meeting the professional demands placed upon those in the mission. Some units feel the stresses as national 'standard bearers', while others feel neglected or unnecessarily relied upon due to the reluctance of other countries to share the burden. Finally, there is the whole range of issues related to personal stress and possible mental injury caused by exposure to traumatic situations. Learning to prepare units and people for these stress points is vital to effective peacekeeping, and to maintaining the effectiveness of military forces for all forms of operation.

### A *The Pressures upon the Standard Bearers*

Each nation's military faces different stresses in PKO, not only based upon their deployment and roles, but also due to matters of domestic policy. The Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) faced stresses perhaps unique in PKO. The very legitimacy of the JSDF was questioned by large sections of Japanese society for being in breach of the 1947 'peace' constitution, which expressly forbids the maintenance of military forces and the right of belligerency. The long and tortuous process by which legislation was passed in order to allow JSDF participation in UN missions merely emphasized the point that the eyes of the nation were on them in their first PKO. The fact that this was in Cambodia, formerly occupied by the Imperial Army, merely emphasized the degree to which the JSDF were sensitive to the responsibilities being placed upon them, not helped by the legal restraints of uniquely restrictive ROE, and lists of prohibited duties. Marrack Goulding describes visiting the JSDF contingent in Cambodia and finding the engineering battalion personnel seemingly, "...overwhelmed by their responsibility for ensuring that it was a success."<sup>43</sup>

However, due to the professionalism of the JSDF, their contribution to UNTAC and to later PKO and humanitarian missions led to a significant improvement in their profile and public opinion ratings in Japan. As one commentator noted, "*for decades the Self-Defense Forces were considered people who "live under a rock."*<sup>44</sup> In the 1970s, SDF members were discriminated against, rejected by universities, and even occasionally refused the right to register themselves and their families at city halls. Thus was the polarized Cold War view of the 'non-military', with such a low sense of public esteem that in 1975 when JSDF personnel were asked by the Japan Defense Agency, "*Do you feel the work of the SDF is meaningful?*" over 48% answered in the negative.<sup>45</sup> In the post-UNTAC environment, the JSDF have come out into the daylight, greatly improved their recruitment rates, their range of mission capabilities, and although far more constricted by legal limitations on their activities than most armed forces, have been trusted with increasing responsibilities.

Contrast this with the experience in Cambodia of the other Japanese contribution to UNTAC, the 70 Japanese CIVPOL officers. They were initially seen as the more acceptable face of peacekeeping to many in Japan concerned with an anti-militarism and pacifist agenda. This was altered by the death of one officer and injuries sustained by several others in an attack on their outpost by Khmer Rouge forces. From then on, the Japanese CIVPOL refused to per-

<sup>43</sup> Goulding, Marrack, *Peacemonger*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2003, p. 263.

<sup>44</sup> Green, Michael J, *Reviving Japan's Military*, in: The Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2007. Available online at: <http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB116881980420076629.html> .

<sup>45</sup> See *Defense of Japan, 1976*, Japan Defence Agency, Tokyo, pp. 59 and 118.

form certain duties, insisted on changing their duty areas, and threatened to withdraw from the mission. Such was the negative impact of experience in PKO that no Japanese CIVPOL unit has been deployed since, only individual observers. The Japanese CIVPOL experience reinforces the impression gained from German troops' less than wonderful impressions of being deployed to Cambodia and Somalia, that PKO is not in itself a positive experience, but *may be* a positive experience given sufficient training, preparation, and providing units with tasks suited to their abilities.

### ***B Representing the World: Disparity in Burden Sharing***

There is a massive disproportion in the numbers of personnel provided by the UN member states. In March 2007, the top three providers of police and military personnel were Pakistan (10,173 personnel), Bangladesh (9,675), and India (9,471), while the US was 43<sup>rd</sup> (321), Russia 44<sup>th</sup> (300), and Japan 81<sup>st</sup> (38).<sup>46</sup> This inevitably raises some stress points between contingents and between commanders, particularly if there is a poor security environment dominated by weapons sold by the UNSC P5, as is usually the case.

While it is clear that some countries 'sell' their military services for the financial compensation provided by the UN, with Fiji, Nepal, and Bangladesh being among those most frequently mentioned in this context, and therefore happy to provide large numbers of troops, there is a clear understanding that most Western countries will not provide large numbers of personnel for service in distant, harsh, and dangerous locations unless there is a security imperative greater than simple human security. This explains the general reluctance to send Western troops to African missions, especially under UN command. The cases when developed countries have withdrawn forces from PKO, such as Rwanda, due to the hazardous environment, have impacted quite significantly on morale and mission capabilities. The lack of capabilities from the onset of certain missions, particularly related to logistics and force protection, including the provision of extraction force capability (the stand-by arrangements by which non-PKO forces are available to assist mission staff in withdrawing from the local area if conditions become too hazardous to continue, such as the outbreak of war), seems to instill the military components of PKO with a less ambitious desire for mission accomplishment. Local commanders usually react well to the presence of pro-active, professional troops in their vicinity, and rise to the challenge of cooperating with them.<sup>47</sup>

### ***C The Psychological Strain***

#### ***1. Identifying the Condition***

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) identifies three forms of stress in its materials for PKO trainers:

- Basic stress

---

<sup>46</sup> United Nations, *Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations*, 31 March 2007, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Available online at: [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2007/march07\\_2.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2007/march07_2.pdf) .

<sup>47</sup> Urquhart, Brian, *A Life in Peace and War*, Harper and Row, London, 1987.

- Cumulative Stress
- Critical Traumatic Stress (Traumatic Stress), or CTS

Basic stress comes from daily discomfort and fatigue, including homesickness, and problems with colleagues, and as such is 'normal' and manageable. Cumulative Stress arises when basic stress is not relieved and when individuals feel overwhelmed by responsibilities or stressful environments on a repeated basis. "When it goes unnoticed, or when it is not well managed, cumulative stress can result in a burnout."<sup>48</sup> Critical Traumatic Stress is brought on by an experience beyond the range of 'normality'. This may be a traffic accident, humanitarian or natural disaster, or scenes of extreme violence, or loss of life. The repetition of such events does not usually reduce the stress but compound it.

The symptoms of stress can be both physical and mental, and usually involve an inability to concentrate upon immediate tasks, to think logically and rationally, and sweating, nausea, inability to eat and sleep, and shaking. Often it also manifests itself in recourse to sex and/or drugs, particularly alcohol and tobacco, as means of escape from physical and mental symptoms.

One of the most commonly recognised stress-related illnesses is Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, first diagnosed among US Vietnam veterans in the late 1960s, but only officially recognised gradually throughout the 1970s. Although today PTSD is almost universally accepted, even in 1982 the British armed forces had scarcely heard of it and despite compelling evidence throughout the 1980s, there was and remains no official recognition of PTSD among Falkland veterans.<sup>49</sup> It does seem that incidences of PTSD in Falklands Veterans were somewhat affected by the 'cool down' period after cessation of hostilities, and the journey home. It seems that those who sailed home, taking several weeks, were able to talk through their experiences with the only people who could truly understand their feelings, while those who flew, taking 24 hours, were faced with the greater shock of the 'understanding gap' between combatants and non-combatants. Some militaries have learned this lesson, and have 'cool down' camps for PKO participants, but this is not widespread. The damage done to large numbers of PKO veterans, particularly those who leave the military, or were reservists, and therefore outside current military observation and care, is an unquantifiable and largely silent cost of peacekeeping.<sup>50</sup>

## 2. Operational Stress

The intensity of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to a massive degree of stress placed upon troops, of all three varieties. The toll of such a high tempo rotation of forces has led to increased rates of resignations and refusal to re-enlist in both Britain and the US. The basic stresses of separation from families and the poor conditions of service, the cumulative stress of facing the same problems in each country and of them becoming repetitive, and the

---

<sup>48</sup> UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Standardized Training Generic Modules: STGM 4 Stress Management*, UNDPKO, 2003. Available online at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/sgtm/sgtm.htm>.

<sup>49</sup> Shephard, Ben, *A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists 1914-1994*, Pimlico, London, 2002, pp. 377-384; Jones, Edgard and Simon Wessely, *Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychiatry from 1900 to the Gulf War*, Psychology Press, 2005.

<sup>50</sup> Conversations with Wrightson, Kate, Clinical Psychologist, Northumbria, September 2006.

CTS of the most intensive war fighting seen since 1945 have driven many units to exhaustion, to the point where they are no longer capable of rapid deployment. “They are scraping to get people to go back and people are worn out,” commented one senior US navy psychiatrist.<sup>51</sup> It was reported in August 2007 that the US Army was facing its highest suicide rate in 26 years, and that more than a third of troops returning from operations are seeking military psychiatric help.<sup>52</sup>

While the ‘Iraq factor’ should not be underestimated, the UK military was suffering from the problems of ‘overstretch’ before 9/11. At one point in 2000, the British Army had over 70% of its trained personnel overseas on operations, standard deployments, or international exercises, with the largest operational commitments being Kosovo, Bosnia, and Northern Ireland, at a time when the army was at its smallest since 1827. This scale of deployment, mainly unaccompanied, placed great strain upon families and relationships, to such a degree that retention and recruitment were affected, prompting the British government to offer ‘golden hellos’ to new recruits, and ‘golden handcuffs’ to retain key personnel, particularly aircrew, medical staff, communications specialists, and linguists.<sup>53</sup> The situation of ‘overstretch’ is clear from the evidence that in August 2002, almost 10% of the UK armed forces personnel were incapacitated, only able to perform light duties, or undergoing psychiatric treatment.<sup>54</sup> By 2006, this number had been added to by over 1500 Army personnel being treated for psychological problems directly related to service in Iraq.<sup>55</sup>

### 3. Attempting to Reduce the Stress Injuries and Casualties

Studies have found, not surprisingly, that where soldiers clearly understand the purpose of the PKO, and where their families and wider society understand and agree with the mission aims, then soldier motivation and performance will tend to increase.<sup>56</sup> It seems that each national contingent has had differing views on PKO ‘value’, and even then opinions have varied significantly. Norwegian, Swedish and Austrian troops have been generally positive toward PKO experiences since the end of the Cold War, perhaps reflecting their countries’ limited non-PKO military profiles. US troops by contrast seem to have quite ambivalent towards PKO in the 1990s. Even within this comparison, however, there are significant variables. Afro-American soldiers felt generally more positive about serving in PKO in Haiti and Somalia, and female soldiers were seen as generally more enthusiastic about PKO than males, as well

---

<sup>51</sup> Thomas Grieger, speaking to *The International Herald-Tribune*, quoted in Peter Beaumont, *Fatigue cripples US army in Iraq*.

<sup>52</sup> Doyle, Leonard, *Suicide Rate in US Army at Highest in 26 Years*, in: *The Independent*, 17 August 2007. Available online at: <http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/article2871520.ece>.

<sup>53</sup> See Mulloy, Garren, *A British Way in War and Peace: UK Post-Cold War Defence Reform* (in Japanese), in: *Journal of International Security (JAIS)* (Volume 29, Issue 3), 2001.

<sup>54</sup> Norton-Taylor, Richard, *Stand by your sickbeds*, in: *The Guardian*, 14 August 2002. Available online at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/military/story/0,11816,774249,00.html>.

<sup>55</sup> Woolf, Marie, *800 British troops treated at the Priory: Flashbacks of atrocities haunt soldiers crippled by post-traumatic stress disorder on their return from Iraq*, in: *The Independent*, 6 August 2006. Available online at: [http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/this\\_britain/article1215976.ece](http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/this_britain/article1215976.ece).

<sup>56</sup> Segal, David R and Mady Wechsler Segal, MW (eds), *Peacekeepers and Their Wives: American Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers*, Greenfield Press, Westport, 1993.



as more positive responses from logistic and support units than from combat units.<sup>57</sup> However, such a result could say more about the lack of PKO-related training given to combat units (infantry etc.) in the US Army compared to that in Australia, Sweden, or Ireland (for example).

Lars Weisaeth suggests that NATO PKO produced slightly less anxiety among members and families than UN-led operations, with the UNPROFOR to Intervention Force (IFOR) transition example, but this does rather ignore the attendant differences between the two missions.<sup>58</sup> The frustration was primarily that UNPROFOR was attempting to conduct PKO and PSO without any peace agreement, whereas IFOR was a PEO force, but in place *after* the peace agreement had been signed.

Studies of Bosnia have indicated that rather than gunfire and shelling, the ambient fear of mines was a significant stressor for PKO personnel. Also, both exposure to trauma, such as seeing atrocities or the results of atrocities, or witnessing death were natural stressors identified in studies of Bosnian peacekeepers, with many respondents feeling “*double helplessness*”, as helpless witnesses to helpless victims, leading to great frustration.<sup>59</sup> Where troops have been able to remove this sense of helplessness and frustration, they have greatly benefited in mental health terms, even though they have as a matter of consequence faced the threats of gunfire and mines. One example was the action taken by Colonel Bob Stewart in Bosnia when confronted by Croats attacking Muslim villages he ordered his troops to position themselves in the line of fire, thereby enabling them to respond with weapons under their restrictive ROE. The helplessness in this particular case was the result not of training, or poor resources, but of the confused overlapping mandates and duties placed upon UNPROFOR by the international community. It was tasked with guarding humanitarian supplies, but without the ROE or mandate to ‘force’ these supplies through. It was later given the duty of protecting ‘safe havens’, but without sufficient means or rules to do so. The mission was a PSO, then a PKO, within a war zone, and later a PEO with a PSO/PKO force structure with ROE and mandates being made up on an ad hoc basis in New York. Stewart’s actions may have helped human security in some small way, but seemed to do a great deal to help his troops deal with their position as professional soldiers in a complex PKO.

Helplessness is compounded by frustration at the need to follow such rules of the mission (such as neutrality between warring parties, or restrictive ROE, as above), even when they seem not to satisfy the innate sense of justice of the peacekeeper’s home culture, or not being able to implement such ‘natural’ rules of justice due to lack of legal basis. German troops forced to let hostile gunmen free in Afghanistan, or Swedish soldiers kidnapped at gunpoint in Lebanon who later meet their captors at checkpoints and are unable to arrest them, are just two examples from operations. This leads to a sense of enhanced frustration with the mission, with personal performance, with the local people, and with military service, generally. For military personnel, this form of frustration is humiliation. It is compounded when the highest ranking members of the mission pyramid are humiliated, for this humiliates every mission member. Cases have included the SRSG being prevented from travelling, as happened to

---

<sup>57</sup> Britt, Thomas W, *Can Participation in Peacekeeping Missions be Beneficial? The Importance of Meaning as a Function of Attitudes and Identity*, in Britt, Thomas W. and Amy B. Adler (eds), *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper*, Praeger, Westport, 2003, pp. 71-88.

<sup>58</sup> Weisaeth, Lars, *The Psychological Challenges of Peacekeeping Operations*, in Britt, Thomas W. and Amy B. Adler (eds), *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper*, Praeger, Westport, 2003, pp. 207-222.

<sup>59</sup> Weisaeth, Lars, *The Psychological Challenges of Peacekeeping Operations*, pp. 213-214.

Akashi Yasushi in both Cambodia and Bosnia, the former occasion being notable as both he and the UNTAC force commander, Lt-General Sanderson, were halted by a Khmer Rouge sentry blocking the road with only a bamboo fence.<sup>60</sup> There are opportunities for military units to break through this humiliation by the precise application of force, such as Bob Stewart in Bosnia, Dutch UNIFIL peacekeepers with TOW missiles in Lebanon, and ‘snatch’ operations against indicted war criminals. These are rare cases though. The only effective remedies are training, communication, and cooperation with non-military resources, such as CIVPOL, legal administrative staff, and local institutions.

#### 4. *Lessons from the Field*

##### Srebrenica

The events leading up to the surrender of Srebrenica by the Dutch battalion in 1995, and the subsequent murder of over 8000 civilians by Serb forces are too involved to be recounted in total. The key points for this study are that they were deployed to a ‘safe haven’ as part of a confused and ill-considered strategy to respond in a public manner to appalling acts of inhumanity in the Bosnian War, without a clear purpose, without clear ROE, without intelligence, and without a clear sense of command and control in the mission. At various times the British and French governments demanded air strikes to curb Serb military advances, and at other times vetoed such strikes, as their troops were taken hostage (or threatened with kidnap). The Dutch government responded similarly, demanding their battalion were reinforced with ground and air forces, but later fretting that they might be dragged into a ‘hot’ war.

The surrender of the town by the Dutch Commander Colonel Thomas Karremans was televised and deepened the sense of humiliation. Serb forces committing rape and murder in front of Dutch troops, and the pleas of local people to hide and transport women and children merely completed the experience of failure in terms of military mission and in human justice.<sup>61</sup> As one Dutch academic commented, “*Dutch commanders and their troops were cowards. By extension, the entire Dutch nation are cowards.*”<sup>62</sup> Although the Dutch investigation forced the resignation of the Army Chief of Staff, and the Prime Minister also resigned to take responsibility, the public mood even after 12 years seems to be that the military failed in its basic duty to protect life.

##### Rwanda

The events surrounding Rwanda in 1994, when approximately 800,000 people, mainly Tusti, were massacred in four months, are even more complex than those in Srebrenica. The UN, Belgium, France, and the US were implicated in the confusion and collusion of the international response that compounded the bloody plot of the MRND ruling party of Hutus and their

<sup>60</sup> Pouligny, Beatrice, *Peace Operations Seen From Below: UN Missions and Local People*, Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, 2006, pp. 125-126.

<sup>61</sup> International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, *Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic*, Case Number.: IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001. Available online at: <http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialC1/judgement/krs-tj010802e.pdf> .

<sup>62</sup> Quotation of de Swaan, Abram in: Daruvalla, Abi, *The Anatomy of a Massacre*, in: Time, 21 April 2002. Available online at: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901020429-232505,00.html> .



associated militias. However, the UN and its leading representatives were certainly responsible for demeaning themselves, and placing their representatives, the military and civilian personnel of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), in such a position to make their job impossible and their security so imperiled that 27 members, 22 soldiers, three unarmed military observers, one civilian police officer, and one Rwandan staff member were killed. The mood was set by the murder of 10 Belgian troops in cold blood, after they had been disarmed, and the Belgian government soon announced all Belgian troops would be withdrawn from the mission, soon followed by many other nations, while the Force Commander, and at times acting SRSG, Major-General Romeo Dallaire had also to contend with contingent commanders under orders from home governments to prioritize 'force security' over all else, thus refusing most duties. Dallaire, his staff officers, and dozens of loyal troops, particularly the unarmed military observers, performed near miracles in keeping some humanitarian aid flowing into the capital Kigali, and protecting some of the Tutsis and moderate Hutus being targeted by the killers.

The strain of this told on all members. Dallaire was only the most prominent member of the UN mission to suffer psychologically, with depression, physical fatigue, PTSD, and suicide attempts. Most other sufferers were simply lost within institutions upon returning home. Not only had UNAMIR members experienced the 'double hopelessness' dilemma, but they were also extremely aware that the killing could easily be halted. The killers were not an industrial army, as was partly the case in Bosnia, nor a heavily weaponized society like Somalia. Most of the Rwandan slaughter was perpetrated by civilians with clubs and machetes, in full public view. Dallaire himself estimated that a reinforced brigade force with motor transport and helicopters dispatched immediately after the outbreak of killing, and at the time of his first warnings to New York, could have saved more than half the lives lost. The realization of this was a tragic blow to the peacekeepers.<sup>63</sup>

##### 5. *Factors Affecting Reactions to Stress*

Many factors affect the ability to withstand stress and one of them is age. Occupational therapist Major Stacie Caswell, of a combat stress unit attached to the military hospital in Mosul, commented that the US Army in Iraq now has, "*older soldiers coming in - up to 41 years old - and that is causing its own problems. They have difficulty dealing with the physical impact of the war and also interacting with the younger men.*"<sup>64</sup> In a very different environment, the Japanese found a similar problem through their participation in the UN Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) in 1993. The commander of the first contingent (only Japan's second PKO), found that the younger members of the contingent were much better able to physically and mentally deal with the harsh operating, and living environments, and were far more flexible in communication patterns, including in absorbing languages used in their UN camps (mainly English and Portuguese). Without a designated translator, and dependent upon the Portuguese and Italians for utilities, food, water, and general security, the roles which the

---

<sup>63</sup> Dallaire, Roméo, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, Arrow Books, London, 2005.

<sup>64</sup> Peter Beaumont, *Fatigue cripples US army in Iraq*.

older contingent members could actually perform were limited, yet the demands of the military hierarchy to maintain the classic 'pyramid' of command dictated their presence.<sup>65</sup>

Another stress factor that has become a problem for many militaries is the degree to which reserve personnel have been utilised. As noted, above, many Western militaries have relied upon reservists throughout the past 15 years for niche skills in PKO. The US relied upon the 353<sup>rd</sup> Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserve for managing many of the post-conflict reconstruction projects in Kosovo in 1999, with the Command's reservist staff of bankers, fund managers, lawyers and other specialists being perfectly suited to perform such tasks. 96% of US Civil Affairs personnel are reservists.<sup>66</sup> The problems stemmed from these most able of staff being removed from their civilian occupations for months on end, creating family stresses, but also significant economic hardship as Army salaries were often a fraction of those earned in their civilian positions.

Most Civil Affairs personnel were working in positions essentially similar to those in civilian life, but for many reservists their military roles in PKO were in stark contrast to their regular occupations, and thus the levels of stress higher. In East Timor, a large portion of the New Zealand infantry deployed in later contingents were reservists, so thinly spread were regular personnel, and most had no regular military experience, and held jobs in farming, service industries, and education.<sup>67</sup> In Iraq, the British Army has increasingly deployed junior reservist soldiers to fill its depleted ranks. A regular Army Captain commented that of the reserves he commanded in Iraq, the military experience of some was impressive, whereas others were rather 'green', "*in the case of one junior soldier, four weekends and a two week battle camp...prior to mobilization.*" He also commented that this soldier was involved in many high intensity combat 'contacts', and upon return to the UK would have limited psychological and welfare assistance from the military. "*I personally feel that we used that young man to his utter limit on the very minimum of training and investment,*" and that if, "*he has any problems how will they manifest themselves, and who will care for him? Where is the duty of care in this case?*"<sup>68</sup> There is a common view that military commanders and politicians are underestimating the personal stresses on reserve personnel and the care that they shall require in the future, as well as the equivalent forms of support for their families that regular troops receive: all too often reserve families are left quite isolated and forced to rely upon mainstream media for information, a cause of significant concern when casualties have become so commonplace.<sup>69</sup> Furthermore, those reserve personnel who have served in multiple missions, as has been common in the 1990s and since 9/11, have found that upon return to civilian life they have not only to suffer the problems of civilian-readjustment but also have frequently suffered in promotion terms, with many resigning from the reserves in case their careers are threatened. There have been many instances also of the employment protection provisions of reserve service being avoided, with reservists being made redundant within months of their re-

---

<sup>65</sup> Interview with Colonel Nakano Shigenori, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, Research Development Planning Staff, GSDF Research Headquarters, Camp Asaka, Saiatama, Japan, 20<sup>th</sup> August 2007 (as Major Nakano, commander of first GSDF contingent to UNOMOZ, May 1993).

<sup>66</sup> US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-57.1 Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 2003. Available online at: [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_57\\_1.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_57_1.pdf).

<sup>67</sup> Interview with Dickens, David (Victoria University), Wellington, New Zealand, February 2002.

<sup>68</sup> Curry, Captain Charlie, quoted in: Holmes, Richard, *Dusty Warriors*, Harper Perennial, London, 2007, pp. 346-7.

<sup>69</sup> Stewart, Col. Bob, *We Ask Too Much of Our TA Soldiers*, in: The Daily Telegraph, 23 August 2007. Available online at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2007/08/23/do2303.xml>.

turn, it being made clear that their past, and anticipated future, absences are costs that commercial concerns cannot afford to bear.<sup>70</sup>

## VII. Lack of Training for Peacekeeping-Specific Tasks

Most militaries had conducted very little PKO specific training before they embarked upon such missions for the first time. This was natural in the Cold War period, where operations were small scale and certainly of minor significance compared with the primary defence missions of the respective contributing countries.

### A. PKO Training Development

More surprising is the degree to which PKO-specific training has been neglected in the period since the end of the Cold War. There has been a proliferation of PKO training centres, well beyond the roll call of usual candidates such as Canada, Sweden and Finland, with Bangladesh, India and many other developing countries having established facilities and engaged in institutional cooperative measures. However, Japan, which first participated in PKO in 1992, only established its first PKO training establishment in March 2007. The complementary Lessons Learned body will not be established until March 2008. A GSDF General admitted that Japan entered PKO with no doctrine or mission specific training, and still, in 2007, has no such doctrine or field manual, although much was learned through conversations with US Army officers who had experience with the US mission in Sinai.<sup>71</sup> Militaries with extensive PKO and OOTW experience are not immune from arriving in-country unprepared. A senior British Army staff officer commented that his force arrived Bosnia with almost no intelligence or even basic information about the country: “...we were living in the Dark Ages...we did not understand the conflict when we deployed.”<sup>72</sup>

Despite the establishment of PKO training centres and the extensive development of relevant doctrine, there is doubt as to how much attention has been paid to such efforts. The US Army established its U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) in 1993, and in 2003 the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) assumed PKI responsibilities within the Center for Strategic Leadership of the U.S. Army War College. The experience of Somalia and the short comings in the US Army in peacekeeping duties aided the establishment of the PKI, which bore fruit from 1999, when US Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) units performed extremely well in aiding the reconstruction of civil institutions in Kosovo. However, most of the CIMIC units in Kosovo were reserve units, activated for the emergency, rather than regular, mainstream units. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century there was an increasing emphasis placed upon ‘warrior’ values, and the US Army homepage prominently places an evocation of its “*Warrior Ethos*”, with a quote of Chief of Staff, General PJ Schoomaker:

---

<sup>70</sup> Mervin, Kevin J, *Weekend Warrior: A Territorial Soldier's War in Iraq*, Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 2005.

<sup>71</sup> Interview with Japan Ground Self-Defense Force General, August 2007.

<sup>72</sup> Aldrich, Richard J, *From Ireland to Bosnia: Intelligence Support for UK Low Intensity Operations*, in: de Jong, Ben, Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, Wies Platje, Robert David Steele (eds), *Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future*, OSS International Press, Oakton, Virginia, 2003, p. 79.



*“We need to think of our Army as an expeditionary force. We need to encourage innovation and increase resiliency. And most important, we need to reinforce the Warrior Ethos in every Soldier.”<sup>73</sup>*

Such an ethos does not preclude the ability to be effective peacekeepers, but it does raise questions about the ability to cover the entire military-peacekeeping spectrum. Despite the excellent work done on PKO and Counter-Insurgency (COIN) doctrine, the fact remains that the latest 400 page COIN Field Manual for US forces contains only 6 paragraphs, in a late appendix, on development issues in military operations.<sup>74</sup>

## **B Police Issues**

While it is easy to encourage militaries to, at times, imitate and learn from their police colleagues, it remains unclear what exactly they are being encouraged to learn. Each police force has very different characteristics, from the unitary unarmed constabularies of Britain, to the local, state and federal police forces of Germany, with specialist anti-terrorist ‘special unit’ GSG-9. Police work is as varied as military work.

When examining military roles in PKO, there are some areas where duties performed by police can be readily adapted by military forces’ training programmes. These include the establishment of community aid posts at the lowest of levels, as practiced by Japanese police through the system known as ‘Koban’, or police boxes, where people drop in to ask directions, report small crimes, or ask advice. They are also popular with old people wanting to chat, sit down, or use the telephone. While this may seem rather at odds with soldiering, a community presence *of value to the community* is something that many military PKO missions lack. There is also a significant problem of military forces lacking local community intelligence concerning such matters as the local community mood, issues of concern, intra-community disputes, and financial problems. As (former Major-General and UN Commander, Sarajevo) Lewis MacKenzie commented:

*The UN treats intelligence gathering with great suspicion, because it is deemed to be spying on member states. We once found ourselves in the situation where the BBC World Service was telling us what was happening 200 metres away from our own headquarters. That was really frustrating.<sup>75</sup>*

British experience in Northern Ireland was crucial to its desire and ability to create local intelligence during UNPROFOR (under British Commanders), as it had worked in conjunction with the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and had developed an intelligence pre-deployment training unit for Northern Ireland in Germany. This led to the establishment of the UN Training Assistance Team (UNTAT) in the UK as support for UNPROFOR, but it was not institutionalized by the UN for future operations, despite its value, and proof that despite

<sup>73</sup> US Army, *Warrior Ethos*. Available online at: <http://www.army.mil/warriorethos> .

<sup>74</sup> US Department of Defence, *The US Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (No. 3-24/No.3-33.5)*, University of Chicago Press, 2007, pp. 357-8.

<sup>75</sup> Quoted in, Johnston, Paul, *No Cloak and Dagger Required: Intelligence Support to UN Peacekeeping*, in: de Jong, Ben, Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, Wies Platje, Robert David Steele (eds), *Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future*, OSS International Press, Oakton, Virginia, 2003, p. 319.

the differences of Bosnia and Northern Ireland, “*there is a generic low intensity operations intelligence*”.<sup>76</sup> The Northern Ireland example is also valuable for examining how the local police, the (RUC), dealt with security problems directly connected to more than a third of the population being hostile to the status quo seemingly represented by the RUC. The RUC established not only intelligence capabilities to gain information useful in preventing and solving crime, but also established consultative bodies to gain ‘intelligence’ as to what the hostile sections of the community wanted from the police. The Nationalist community was most reluctant to deal with the RUC, with the result that the terrorist groups, such as the IRA filled the void and gained social acceptance. The RUC established neutral-venue, confidential, community consultation committees where individuals or representatives could vent frustrations, ask for help, or provide information. This worked successfully for both sides, and allowed for a way around the ‘big questions’ of whether Northern Ireland should be British or Irish, and whether the ‘royal’ RUC were a fit police force for the Nationalist community.<sup>77</sup>

The experience of gendarmerie and carabinieri in PKO demonstrates that many militaries lack their ability to adjust to changing security environments, particularly dealing with civil unrest and rioting. Kimberly Zisk Marten has illustrated how these ‘para-military’ forces were called upon in Bosnia and Kosovo to fill the gaps left by militaries that withdrew troops from civil unrest situations for legal or other reasons, bridging the gap between military and CIVPOL forces. However, she also made it clear that certain CIVPOL were simply inadequate for the mission, such as the US CIVPOL recruited to KFOR from the National Park Ranger service.<sup>78</sup> Police from Germany, France, Northern Ireland and other countries where they have played a role in not only regular civil policing but also maintaining public order in an environment of hostility have provided valuable experience, not only operationally, but also in the training of local police officers.<sup>79</sup> This process has been taken a step further with the Italian Carabinieri MSU (Multinational Specialised Unit) in Bosnia providing the basis for the EU Integrated Police Unit, deployable with military forces for humanitarian, peacekeeping and disaster relief operations. As mentioned previously, due to capability gaps in ‘limited spectrum’ militaries, these police forces have been able to firmly establish themselves in PKO.

### **VIII. Best Practice as the Benchmark: No Single Magic Solution.**

This study dwells on the negative effects of military aspects of peace operations, on the personnel and institutions conducting them. It must always be remembered, however, that the people and organisations that participate in PKO invariably gain something from the experience. This may be in a sense of personal, professional, or institutional satisfaction of having made a contribution to human security or development, or simply in having prevented an even worse situation developing. Certain ‘best practice’ lessons can be drawn and recommendations made.

<sup>76</sup> Aldrich, Richard J, *From Ireland to Bosnia: Intelligence Support for UK Low Intensity Operations*, p. 94.

<sup>77</sup> Interviews: O’Byrnn, Owen, Education Officer, Sinn Fein, Falls Road, West Belfast, Northern Ireland, September 1999; Birnie, Dr. Esmond, N.I. Assembly Member, Ulster Unionist Party, Stormont, Northern Ireland, September 1999; Sergeant ‘B’, former member Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1962-1995, East Belfast, Northern Ireland, September 1999; Commandant and Chief Instructor, Royal Ulster Constabulary Training Centre, Hollywood, Belfast September 1999.

<sup>78</sup> Zisk Marten, Kimberly, *Enforcing the Peace: Learning From the Imperial Past*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2004.

<sup>79</sup> Ryder, Chris, *The RUC, 1922-2000: A Force Under Fire*, Arrow, London, 2000.

## A *Learning to Delegate*

One of the ways in which to ensure that personnel feel valued and capable of performing their duties is to give them duties they feel capable of carrying out. This entails delegating responsibility to those most suited, and allowing them to exercise that authority. The UNDPKO training guide suggests that a typical UN mission be studied to understand demands placed upon each component, and also the need to understand each component's own limitations:

*“Peacekeeping operations that respond to complex emergencies require a multidimensional structure. This is commonly referred to as a complex peacekeeping mission. Complex peacekeeping missions typically consist of the following components:*

- *The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) is responsible for conflict prevention, peacemaking and the overall management of the peacekeeping operation;*
- *The Peacekeeping Force (PKF) is responsible for establishing a safe and secure environment;*
- *The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) is responsible for coordinating the humanitarian relief effort of the various UN humanitarian agencies, international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs);*
- *The Civilian Police (CIVPOL) is responsible for monitoring the local police force, or in some missions, depending on the mandate, for ensuring law & order;*
- *A Human Rights Unit (HR) is responsible for monitoring human rights and for human rights education and advice;*
- *The United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) is responsible for leading the long-term recovery and reconstruction efforts.”<sup>80</sup>*

This multi-agency framework may seem all too clean in theory and easily muddled in practice, but the point of all institutional architecture is to maintain simple lines of responsibility, so that all mission members feel confident of their role and the roles of other members: what do *I* do, how do *they* help me?

In the military context, PKO contingents must learn that although they may have a broad range of skills and capabilities, not all of them will be, or should be, called upon in the mission. Military commanders must learn the benefits of restraint, so that they can plan to assist other mission components but should not expect to be called upon to do so. A common perception of military officers among NGO staff is their arrogance of knowing more about aid work than aid professionals, particularly in the fields of transport and engineering. This is based upon military professional ability in these fields, while development workers are prioritizing not only immediate aid but also establishing the structures by which local people can aid themselves. Greater military attention to training local people, as by British forces in Northern Thailand for road and bridge construction in 1968, would do much to make them a

---

<sup>80</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Standardized Training Generic Modules: STGM 10 UN Civil-Military Coordination*.

more effective mission contributor.<sup>81</sup> Military, and police, personnel must also understand that for the victims of civil war or other forms of violence, the presence of uniformed personnel could be threatening, even in a completely different environment and context. Refugees from the Kosovo conflict initially expressed fear at the presence of police officers and even traffic wardens, for they had associated state uniforms with the oppression that they felt in their homeland.<sup>82</sup>

### ***B Emphasizing the Positive***

While there is much that has gone wrong in peacekeeping, military leaders must re-learn and re-teach the benefits of peacekeeping to themselves and others. The example of Northern Ireland is worth repeating. It enabled the British to maintain their forces at exceptionally high levels of capability and readiness, and through the experience, they developed unrivalled tactical skills and widely applicable civilian cooperation skills, particularly with police. It cost hundreds of lives, and was often seen as a pointless exercise, but it *helped* facilitate the parties in conflict to reach a political accommodation, the latest result of which was the ending of the British Army security operation in 2007. It must be stressed though, that the British Army did not end the conflict, merely helped provide the appropriate security environment in which the parties to the conflict could begin to see an advantage in dialogue, and a disadvantage in armed conflict. In the discussions of the merits of PKO versus PEO, perhaps the concept of PFO, Peace Facilitation Operations, should be considered.

The examples of Japan and many East European countries suggest that the employment of armed forces in PKO can have a rehabilitative effect upon the institutions and the personnel concerned. The JSDF found themselves with roles and responsibilities that eventually met with public approval and greatly elevated their place in society. The militaries of Eastern Europe were able to reinvent themselves in similar ways, by emphasizing their liberal, international credentials through PKO, casting off the old communist state image. For some countries their militaries have become the leading national representatives on the world stage, such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. As reborn states, military participation in PKO is a badge of pride, and it is clear that without the extensive efforts of military reform, integration with NATO, and participation in PKO many of these states would not have qualified so quickly for EU membership.

The examples from Europe provide potential models of networking for best practice in PKO. The main case being in the innovative Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, begun in the mid-1990s, that gradually embraced not only NATO countries, but also the states of Eastern Europe, and most of the neutral countries of Europe. This provided for a network of best practice, with the ability of all to learn from the niche skills of smaller militaries, and the full spectrum capabilities of larger forces. With all states considered on an equal basis, with a common working language agreed (English), and eager participation of all concerned, PfP expanded

---

<sup>81</sup> Clutterbuck, RL, *Fingers in the Mangle: British Military Commitments in the Third World*. This operation reduced the influence of guerrillas operating in the area, cutting the force size by an estimated factor of 5, and increased the reach and confidence of the local police officers. It took 18 months and cost less than (1968) 250,000 Pounds.

<sup>82</sup> Interviews with Kosovar refugees and Clarke, Shirley, Head of Community Services Division, Ullverston District Council, Cumbria, UK, August 1999.



from a small defence cooperation project into a major defence diplomacy and confidence building network covering the whole North Atlantic-Europe area. There have since been the first steps at spreading this network to embrace other countries with similar niche skills and niche needs.

On a personal level, the PKO experience can be extremely positive for soldiers, providing unequalled opportunities to travel, see new cultures, learn new skills, and work with many of the most capable militaries in the world. It has been an increasingly important criterion for promotion, as have the language skills associated with PKO participation. For certain countries, such as Canada, India, Fiji, Britain, and Australia, PKO participation has also given opportunities for senior officers to participate in the command structures of large and complex operations, invaluable as such training opportunities would not be possible unilaterally, including the command of entire missions, and close coordination with multinational civilian agencies.

### *C Preparing for Eventualities*

Best practice in PKO necessitates the most thorough preparation of personnel possible. This has often not been the case, as has been seen in even the most capable militaries. Preparation must be conducted on many different levels, from pre-dispatch information on local infrastructure, politics, society and culture, in addition to security issues, as well as the immediate issues of logistics, command and control, and ROE. Training should be both mission specific, tailored to local and mission needs, and long-term, integrated into regular unit training cycles, and involve the greatest possible integration of 'non-conventional' forms, such as language and terrain variations, legal and ROE scenario changes, and cooperation with civilians.

The specialist training centres in many countries have pioneered the development of such training, but it is now the task of militaries to adapt it from the specialist training environment and integrate it into the mainstream environment. Additionally, militaries need to balance these training innovations with training forms that mean PKO, OOTW, and COIN training complements, rather than competes or clashes with, high intensity war fighting training. Training is not a zero-sum game, and should never be considered as such. That constitutes best practice training for PKO.

## **IX. Conclusion**

Peacekeeping has a price. It can be measured in monetary terms, in time, in lives or homes not saved, and in a failure to protect human security. Positive measures are somewhat more difficult, but this study has attempted to illustrate and appreciate the value of peacekeeping by providing examples of the burdens and costs borne by military contingents and individuals. The contradictory stresses felt by many militaries caught in the 'PKO or war fighting' dilemma have been shown to be largely misplaced, as the skill sets are complimentary and in the 21<sup>st</sup> century there is no tenable possibility for reversion to preparation for single scenario, 'industrial' conflict. Similarly, militaries must learn to appreciate the needs for 'broader security' beyond the immediate 'force security' imperative, and how they may well become more

secure and more effective as a result. Once more, there is no zero-sum game in security terms, but this is difficult for troops at all levels, as well as their families and the wider public to accept. More emphasis should be placed upon educating the public as to the actual role and responsibilities of militaries, particularly in the context of UN agreed human security resolutions.

The stresses and strains of intra-agency, inter-agency, and international cooperation are evident, and should not be underestimated. They bring personal and institutional problems that are more easily prevented than cured, and are best avoided by intense training, preparation, and communication. This is true for all levels, and is as important for the lowest ranking troops to understand as the force commander or SRSG. Politicians and domestic military leaders must also understand these strains, and resist the temptations ever present of using ‘backdoor’ channels of communicating with their national contingents in order to influence or change PKO mission priorities. The multiplication of command and control lines makes for increased confusion and stress, rather than meaningful assistance to the mission. The stresses felt by individuals need to be fully addressed in training, medical provision, and full provision of ‘cool down’ post-mission de-briefing, as well as long-term monitoring and care, of both regular and reserve personnel, as has so often not occurred in the past. Improvements have been made, but much remains to be done, and many militaries seem reluctant to make the necessary investments and mind-set changes.

All of the preceding points depend upon training and a commitment to pursue ‘best practice’. This may seem quite natural and obvious, but for many militaries these are not so easily reformed, due to traditions, conservatism, conflicting interests among services or arms of each service, or due to lack of investment. Best practice can also be a difficult point, with Japan generally adopting an alternative term, ‘good practice’, so as to avoid making judgments of competing visions. There can be resistance to adopting the practices developed by another country or institution, the ‘not invented here’ mindset. This exists not only in militaries. There is too often a natural rejection of ‘best practice’ as developed by an NGO, or police force, for it is seen as inapplicable to a military scenario, but the reverse is all too often also the case. NGOs have been notoriously dismissive of military practices, even while the largest NGO have sometimes administratively come to resemble military bodies.<sup>83</sup> There has been a degree of disquiet between what have all too often been seen as the exclusive domains and procedural islands of military and police procedure. What PKO should have taught all militaries is that they always need to work with police forces, and in certain ways they need to work like police forces. Such prejudice concerning the origins of ‘best practice’ is understandable, but is also simply obsolete. In PKO, there is no ‘ownership’ of doctrine, ideas, or methods, only the responsibility to protect and perform to the highest level possible. The costs of not adopting best practice are ultimately far higher for military personnel, military institutions, and peace-keeping missions than embracing best practice. In furthering human security there is no standing still.

	<p>The HUMSEC project is supported by the European Commission under the Sixth Framework Programme “Integrating and Strengthening the European Research Area”.</p>	
---	---	---

<sup>83</sup> Interview with Collins, Andrew, Director of the Disaster and Development Centre, Northumbria University, 3 September 2007.